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Note
Gender-Based Legislative
Classifications
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
I. INTRODUCTION
At what point does a gender-based legislative classification at-
tain a "fair and substantial relationship" to a permissible state ob-
jective and thereby withstand constitutional challenge? Since it
was posed by the Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,' this question
has yielded neither easy answers, nor answers of any great con-
sistency. In Califano v. Goldfarb,2 the Supreme Court concluded
that the gender-based distinction of a Social Security Act provision
requiring widowers, but not widows, to prove actual dependency
in order to qualify for survivors' benefits violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fifth amendment's due process clause. 3 The dif-
ferent treatment of men and wonen was held to be invidious dis-
crimination against female wage earners, affording them less pro-
tection for their surviving spouses than that provided male employ-
ees. Although the Court's opinion represented only the views of
a four-man plurality, Califano v. Goldfarb does shed light on the
possible approaches Jo the question posed by Reed.
This note will briefly outline recent history of equal protection
and gender-based legislative classifications as well as relate the per-
tinent facts behind the Goldfarb decision.
Basically, if the social security provisions in question were en-
acted with the congressional intent to rectify past and present
discriminatory practices, they very likely will withstand equal pro-
tection scrutiny. If, however, gender differences are merely the
product of groundless stereotyping, such legislative classifications
are rarely declared valid. For this reason, an in-depth review of
congressional intent in enacting the Social Security Act and its sub-
sequent amendments will be made. This note will also examine
the validity of the dissenting proposals that administrative conveni-
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
2. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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ence alone should validate gender-based classification, and that so-
cial security, being a non-contract benefit, requires less scrutiny
than do other divisions of the law.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EQUAL
PROTECTION THEORY
The Constitution prohibits any state from denying a person
equal protection of the laws.4 This provision is universal in its ap-
plication "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and
the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws."5 The ninety years since Mr. Justice Matthews wrote
these words have seen the constitutional scope of equal protection
expand, albeit haltingly, unevenly, and unpredictably, to cover a
variety of judicial concepts.6 "It is far too late in the day to contend
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimina-
tion . . . . 7
Central to equal protection are the concepts of classification and
legislative purpose." The Court has traditionally adopted a two-
tiered system of review in analyzing the relationship between these
two concepts. The lower or minimum tier presumes constitutional-
ity of any classification established by the legislature. The Court
views the statutory classification to determine only if such classifi-
cation "bears a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objec-
tive."9 The basic test, therefore, has been not whether some in-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the equal protection clause
applies only to states, its concepts have been extended to the federal
government by the fifth amendment due process clause. "[A]s this
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
(footnote omitted). See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975).
5. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
6. For example, in the 1960's, equal protection expanded equality beyond
race: Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent criminal
suspects); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (disenfranchised
groups); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (newly resident state wel-
fare applicants).
7. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 71 (1975).
9. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (quoting Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
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equality results from the classification, but whether there exists
any reasonable basis to justify the classification. 10
In the second or upper tier of traditional equal protection re-
view, the Court has scrutinized more carefully classifications which
affect fundamental constitutional rights" and those which are
based on race,' 2 alienage, 13 or national origin.14  The test in the
upper tier review has been whether such classifications advance a
"compelling state interest." The burden of showing the constitu-
tionality of these classifications rests with the government, which
must demonstrate that a compelling state interest is served, the
state's purpose cannot be achieved in a less burdensome manner,
and the public good accomplished outweighs the fundamental rights
impinged. 15 This strict scrutiny or suspect classification has devel-
oped into the Court's primary weapon in insuring equality of op-
portunity by challenging the traditional preeminence of wealthy,
white, Anglo-American males. Implied has been the notion that
opportunities should be available on the basis of personal merit,
and not class identification. Classifications based on sex and ille-
gitimacy have yet to achieve standing as suspect categories, but ap-
pear to require some undetermined level of elevated review in ex-
cess of traditional rational relationship scrutiny.16
10. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
The rules by which this contention must be tested, as
is shown by repeated decisions of this court, are these: 1. The
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption
of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when
it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely ar-
bitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is
called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
11. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel).
12. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
13. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
15. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-69 (1974).
16. At least one state court has seen fit to recognize gender as a suspect
classification:
An analysis of classifications which the Supreme Court has
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In 1971, the Court in Reed v. Reed,17 for the first time, declared
a statute employing a gender-based classification unconstitutional.
The Court determined that the statute provided different treatment
solely on the basis of sex, and thus established a classification sub-
ject to equal protection scrutiny. "A classification 'must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "18
While the Court said scrutiny was required, it did not proceed on
a strict scrutiny analysis, but confined its analysis to a "first tier"
rational relationship inquiry.19 The decision, however, was a dis-
tinct break from prior decisions under the rational relationship
test, in which the constitutional validity of similar preferential stat-
utes was upheld. Fair and substantial had become part of the defi-
nition of rational relationship.
2 0
previously designated as suspect reveals why sex is properly
placed among them. Such characteristics include race ....
lineage or national origin . . . , alienage . . . , and poverty,
especially in conjunction with criminal procedures ....
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status
into which the class members are locked by the accident of
birth. What differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such
as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the
recognized suspect classifications is that the characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society .... The result is that the whole class is relegated
to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities
or characteristics of its individual members .... Where the
relation between characteristic and evil to be prevented is so
tenuous, courts must look closely at classifications based on
that characteristic lest outdated social stereotypes result in
invidious laws or practices.
Another characteristic which underlies all suspect classifi-
cations is the stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship
associated with them .... Women, like Negroes, aliens, and
the poor have historically labored under severe legal and
social disabilities.
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18-19, 485 P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 340 (1971) (footnote omitted).
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). An Idaho statute preferred men to women in ap-
pointment of estate administrators from the same entitlement class.
The Court reversed the Idaho Supreme Court, holding the statute vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
18. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
19. It should be noted, however, that the Reed Court explicitly limited its
decision to father/mother estate administrator applicant disputes, ex-
cluding similar disputes between brother and sister. The Court made
no attempt to address the broad issue of a state's right to classify
solely by gender.
20. In an earlier case, for example, the Court stated:
While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for
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In a 1973 decision a plurality of the Court moved beyond the
first tier rational relationship test and concluded "that classifica-
tions based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage,
or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 21 However, application of the
strict scrutiny test to gender-based statutory classifications, did not
gain majority approval; the Court subsequently reverted to its fair
and substantial rational relationship test, stating that Reed was the
actual basis of decisions invalidating "statutes employing gender as
an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classifica-
tion."22 Reed, interpreted in light of the later cases, seems to man-
date that classifications based upon sex are less than suspect and
not deserving of strict scrutiny, yet are more than minimal and
therefore deserving of only rational relationship analysis. What
emerges is an intermediate approach between rational basis and
compelling interest.
23
The uncertainty of this intermediate approach invites differing
bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women
without rhyme or reason. . . . Michigan evidently believes
that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a
barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may con-
front a barmaid without such protecting oversight. This
Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by
the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainable, as we think
it is, Michigan has not violated its duty to afford equal pro-
tection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either actually
or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators nor ques-
tion their motives. Since the line they have drawn is not
without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the sug-
gestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an
unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize
the calling.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948). See also Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970).
21. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). Only three justices
joined Justice Brennan's opinion. Three more, while concurring in the
outcome, specifically stated the Reed rational relationship test was
broad enough.
22. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); accord, Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974).
23. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword. In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HAiv. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1972). Justice Stevens maintains
there is but one equal protection test inasmuch as there is but one
equal protection clause which "does not direct the courts to apply one
standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other
cases." The two-tier test of equal protection is to be seen as nothing
more than a device to explain decisions that actually apply a single
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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opinions, conflicting conclusions, and inconsistent judgments. When
does a classification bear a fair and substantial relationship as op-
posed to a mere rational relationship? At what point do gender-
based assignments approach "the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause"?
24
III. THE BACKGROUND OF GOLDFARB
Mrs. Hannah Goldfarb worked in the New York City public
school system for nearly twenty-five years prior to her death in
1968. During the entire time of her employment she had paid all
social security taxes required by the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tion Act.25 Following his wife's death, Leon Goldfarb applied for
social security survivor's benefits, but his claim was denied: "You
do not qualify for a widower's benefit because you do not meet
one of the requirements for such entitlement. This requirement
is that you must have been receiving at least one half support from
your wife when she died."'26 Under the Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance Benefits program,27 benefits for widows were
based on the earnings of their husbands, regardless of dependency.
28
But benefits to similarly situated widowers were payable only if
it were shown the widowers had received at least one-half of their
support from their wives.
29
24. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
25. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3126 (1970).
26. Goldfarb v. Secretary of HIEW, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to
as Social Security Act].
28. Id. § 402(e), in pertinent part provides:
(1) The widow. . . of an individual who died a fully in-
sured individual, if such widow...
(A) is not married,
(B) (i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50
but has not attained age 60 and is under a disability...
(C) (i) has filed application for widow's insurance
benefits, or was entitled to wife's insurance benefits ...
and
(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is
entitled to old-age, insurance benefits each of which is less
than the primary insurance amount of such deceased indi-
vidual,
shall be entitled to a widow's insurance benefit for each
month ....
29. Id. § 402(f) provides:
(1) The widower ...of an individual who died a fully
insured individual, if such widower-
(A) has not remarried,
(B) (i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50
but has not attained 60 and is under a disability...
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A three-judge district court held the different treatment man-
dated by the statute constituted invidious discrimination against
female wage earners and that Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to protec-
tion for her surviving spouse equal to that afforded male employees.
She had paid taxes at the same rate as men and was as concerned
about her spouse's welfare in old age as were men. The government
(C) has filed application for widower's insurance bene-
fits or was entitled to husband's insurance benefits, on the
basis of the wages and self-employment income of such indi-
vidual...
(D) i) was receiving at least one-half of his support
as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Secretary, from such individual at the time of her death,
or if such individual had a period of disability which did
not end prior to the month in which she died, at the time
such period began or at the time of her death, and filed proof
of such support within two years after the date of such
death, or, if she had such a period of disability, within two
years after the month in which she filed application with
respect to such period of disability or two years after the
date of such death, as the case may be, or (ii) was receiving
at least one-half of his support, as determined in accord-
ance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, from such
individual at the time she became entitled to old-age or dis-
ability insurance benefits or, if such individual had a period
of disability which did not end prior to the month in which
she became so entitled, at the time such period began or at
the time she became entitled to such benefits, and filed
proof of such support within two years after the month in
which she became entitled to such benefits or, if she had
such a period of disability, within two years after the month
in which she filed application with respect to such period of
disability or two years after the month in which she be-
came entitled to such benefits, as the case may be, and
(E) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is
entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less
than the primary insurance amount of his deceased wife,
shall be entitled to a widower's insurance benefit for each
month....
The definition of what constitutes "at least one-half support" is set
out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (b) (i) (1977):
[A] person is receiving at least one-half of his support from
the insured individual at a specified time if such individual,
for a reasonable period . . . before the specified time, made
regular contributions, in cash or kind, to such person's support
and the amount of such contributions equaled or exceeded
one-half of such person's support during such period.
(c) "Support" defined. The term "support" includes food,
shelter, clothing, ordinary medical expenses, and other ordin-
ary and customary items for maintenance of the person sup-
ported.
(d) "Contributions" defined. "Contributions," as used in
this section, means contributions actually provided by the
contributor from his own property, or the use thereof, or by
the use of his own credit.
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was incapable, in the court's opinion, of justifying the gender-based
distinction.8 0
The Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision:
The gender-based distinction drawn by § 402 (f) (1) (D)-
burdening a widower but not a widow with the task of proving
dependency upon the deceased spouse-presents an equal pro-
tection question indistinguishable from that decided in Wein-
berger v. Wisenfeld . . . . That decision and the decision in
Frontiero v. Richardson ... plainly require affirmance of the
judgment of the District Court.31
Frontiero v. Richardson 32 had ruled unconstitutional a statute
that provided benefits to married male members of the armed serv-
ices regardless of their wives' dependency, while allowing similar
benefits to married female members only if they could prove they
provided over one-half of their husbands' support. The government
justified the statute by "administrative convenience." It claimed
Congress could reasonably have concluded it would be less expen-
sive and easier to presume wives of male servicemen were finan-
cially dependent upon their husbands, while requiring female mem-
bers to establish their husbands' dependency in fact.33 The Court
specifically rejected such a gender-based statutory scheme created
solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, and
concluded "that, by according differential treatment to male and
female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of
achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes vio-
late[d] the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. '34
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,35 like Goldfarb, was concerned with
Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance programs. Section 402
(g) of the Social Security Act3" granted survivors' benefits based
on the earnings of a deceased husband/father covered by the Act
to both his widow and surviving minor children in her care. But
benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife/mother were
granted only to the minor children and not the widower. The Court
struck down the statute as violative of equal protection:
Obviously, the notion that men are more likely than women
to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not
entirely without empirical support .... But such a gender-based
generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the ef-
30. Goldfarb v. Secretary of HEW, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
31. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204 (1977).
32. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
33. Id. at 689.
34. Id. at 690-91.
35. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970).
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forts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute signi-
ficantly to their families' support.
Section 402 (g) clearly operates, as did the statutes invalidated
by our judgment in Frontiero, to deprive women of protection for
their families which men receive as a result of their employment.
E.. [S]ocial security taxes were deducted from [the wife's] salary
during the years in which she worked. Thus, she not only failed
to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly
situated male worker would have received, but she also was de-
prived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to
the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others. Since the
Constitution forbids the gender-based differentiation premised upon
assumptions as to dependency made in the statutes before us in
Frontiero, the Constitution also forbids the gender-based differ-
entiation that results in the efforts of female workers required to
pay social security taxes producing less protection for their families
than is produced by the efforts of men.
3 7
The Court in Goldfarb, based on these two prior decisions, main-
tained that section 402(f) (1) (D)38 could not withstand constitu-
tional attack since it operated to deprive working women of protec-
tion for their families that was afforded similarly circumstanced
working men.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Legislative Purpose
In ascertaining whether the Reed equal protection test was cor-
rectly applied in Goldfarb, the essential inquiries are these: (1)
what governmental interest was the legislature promoting; (2) was
such legislative purpose legitimate; and, (3) if so, does the classifi-
cation established bear a fair and substantial relationship to fur-
thering this legitimate purpose?
If the intention of Congress was to prefer widows over widow-
ers to alleviate the effects of past discrimination against women,
and such intention was the criterion for the development of
the current dependency presumptions, the Court's previous opinions
were strong evidence that such legislation would pass the Reed test.
In Kahn v. Shevin,s 9 the Court upheld a Florida decision validating
a state constitutional provision of a property tax exemption for wid-
ows. 40 The Court took note of the fact that a lone woman faces
financial difficulties exceeding those faced by a lone man: "Whether
from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a
37. 420 U.S. at 645.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1) (D) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
39. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
40. Article IX, § 9 of the 1885 Florida Constitution provided an exemption
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male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the
woman .... 41 While a widower could usually continue his voca-
tion and livelihood following his wife's death, a widow found herself
forced into an unfamiliar market for which her former dependency
left her unprepared. The Court found "[t] here [could] be no doubt
... that Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers
'rest [s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation.' 42 The state law was
found to be reasonably designed to further a legitimate state policy
of easing the financial impact of loss of a spouse upon those on
whom the loss imposed a disproportionately heavy burden.
43
If the legislative intent in the Social Security Act provision in-
volved in Goldfarb reflected a considered judgment by Congress
that the need for financial assistance is greater for a widow than
a widower, "the denial of benefits [could arguably have] reflected
the congressional judgment that aged widowers as a class were suf-
ficiently likely not to be dependent upon their wives that it was
appropriate to deny them benefits unless they were in fact depend-
ent.144 Thus, the differing treatment of the sexes rested upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to
a legitimate legislative objective similar to Kahn.
On the other hand, if the focus of congressional intent was on
the insured spouse rather than the surviving spouse, the Social Se-
curity Act's requirement that widowers provide proof of actual de-
pendency would violate equal protection under Wiesenfeld and
Frontiero, because wage earning females were deprived of the pro-
from taxable property of $200 to every widow supporting a family and
to all disabled persons. Currently, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (West
Supp. 1977) provides: "Property to the value of five hundred dollars
($500) of every widow, blind person, or totally and permanently dis-
abled person who is a bona fide resident of this state shall be exempt
from taxation."
41. 416 U.S. at 353.
42. Id. at 355 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
43. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). In Ballard the
Court upheld a Navy policy with differing mandatory discharge stat-
utes for male and female naval officers. The due process clause was
not violated since the difference in treatment flowed from the fact that
female line officers, because of combat and sea duty restrictions, did
not have equal opportunities for advancement. "In enacting and re-
taining § 6401, Congress may thus quite rationally have believed ...
that a longer period of tenure for women officers would, therefore, be
consistent with the goal to provide women officers with 'fair and
equitable career advancement programs.'" Id. at 508.
44. 430 U.S. at 207 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 12).
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tection for their families that males received. The Goldfarb Court
was divided, with the plurality focusing on the insured spouse, the
dissenters on the plight of the widow.
Since its inception, social security has been a program of social
insurance distributing benefits according to family relationships.
Wage earners procure coverage through their role as the family pro-
vider while spouses, children, and parents receive benefits as de-
pendents.45 Since the program's benefit structure is rooted in tradi-
tional assumptions regarding the roles of family members, depend-
ents' benefits have been largely defined in terms of sex. Still, the
underlying premise is that of the covered wage earner and of the
covered wage earner's dependents.
46
The statute specifically required beneficiaries to be dependent
on the covered wage earner. For example, a widow of a fully in-
sured individual is treated as a dependent beneficiary unless her
own primary insurance equals or exceeds her deceased husband's
primary insurance amount 47 or if she remarries. 48 That is, the stat-
utes presume dependency of married women on their husbands un-
til it is specifically shown they are dependent on another (remarry)
or are self-dependent (a fully covered wage earner in their own
right) .49 This is in accord with the general purpose of social secu-
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
46. Social Security's concept of the "family" has not remained static. The
original Act of 1935 provided a system of old-age insurance as a long-
run safeguard against the occurrence of old-age dependency only for
the actual worker in industry and commerce. In 1939 the Act was
considerably broadened, extending old-age insurance protection to the
wife and children of the retired worker as well as to his surviving
widow and children. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. II, § 202,
49 Stat. 623; Amendment of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 201, 53 Stat. 1362,
1363-64 (current revision at 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (e), (g) (1970 &
Supp. I-V 1971-1975)). Still the basic assumption husbands were
the family providers remained. If such an assumption proved to be
the only criterion Congress considered in treating men differently from
women the statute must be invalidated.
"[While] the notion that men are more likely than women to be
the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not
entirely without empirical support, . . . such a gender-based
generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the
efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute
significantly to their families' support."
430 U.S. at 205-06 (quoting Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645
(1975)).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2) (A) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
48. Id. § 402 (e) (1) (A).
49. Riches, Women Workers and Their Dependents Under the 1950 Amend-
ments, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug., 1951, at 9, 11. If the purpose of extend-
ing coverage to widows was merely to mitigate past discriminatory
treatment against woman as the Goldfarb dissent contends, such ex-
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rity as ascertained by the Court in previous opinions, that is, to
provide support for dependents of wage earners who have lost their
primary earning power due to retirement, disability or death, and
to provide replacements for those lost earnings. 50
Benefits are extended on a sole criterion of dependency rather
than on a basis of pure economic assistance as are welfare programs.
No one is entitled to social security benefits unless he or she is
a covered wage earner or a dependent of a covered wage earner.
"This accords with the system's general purpose; one who was not
dependent to some degree on the covered wage earner suffers no
-economic loss when the wage earner leaves the work force."5' 1 The
plurality in Goldfarb maintained that congressional intent was
one of benefitting dependents for lost financial support, and that
Congress had erroneously presumed wives were always dependent
and, therefore, required no proof of dependency.52 There was no
ceptions for non-dependency would be unjustifiably inconsistent with
this legislative purpose.
50. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633 (1974). See also Helvering
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641-45 (1937).
51. 430 U.S. at 213-14.
52. This view was in accord with that of the special advisory council ap-
pointed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in 1969
to submit its findings and recommendations for the social security pro-
grams as required by section 706 of the Social Security Act.
The purpose of the social security program is to provide
a continuing income for a worker and his family when the
worker's earnings are cut off by his retirement in old age, his
disability, or his death. To accomplish this purpose, the pro-
gram provides benefits not only for the worker himself but
also for those of his relatives whom the worker normally sup-
ports or has a legal obligation to support. Benefits are pro-
vided for these relatives because they lose support, or a po-
tential source of support, when the worker's earnings are cut
off. Benefits are provided for a wife or widow without a test
of suppoft because it is reasonable to presume that a wife or
widow loses support, or a potential source of support, when
the husband's earnings are cut off, except in situations where
she, herself, has covered earnings and is eligible for a benefit
on her own account that is larger than her wife's or widow's
benefit. (As discussed later, the wife's or widow's benefit is
not payable in such situations.) On the other hand, men are
generally not dependent upon their wives for support, and a
presumption of dependency that is reasonable for a wife or
widow does not seem to be reasonable for a husband or
widower. Therefore, present law requires that for a man to
get a benefit as a husband or widower, he must establish that
he was actually supported by his wife.
It has been suggested that one could apply the same rules
to a husband or widower as to widows and wives and assume
that he was-dependent upon his wife unless his own benefit
was higher than his benefit as a husband or widower. If this
were done, the men who would get dependents' benefits and
who cannot get them under present law would be chiefly
those who had worked in noncovered employment, such as
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intention of alleviating the financial problems a nondependent
widow might encounter as opposed to a nondependent widower.
The basic criterion for benefits was dependency on a covered wage
earner. The covered wage earner was the source of all benefits
eventually falling to his family. Since only covered wage earners
were required to pay taxes toward the system, benefits must be
distributed according to classifications which do not differentiate
among covered employees solely on the basis of sex.
58
In 1950 coverage was expanded to dependent widowers of cov-
ered females but only if they were receiving at least one-half of
their support from the deceased wife. 54 Again analysis of the legis-
lative history points out that neither the 1950 nor the previous 1939
amendments demonstrate a congressional intent to create a differ-
ence between nondependent widows and nondependent widowers.
The recommendation to extend benefits to dependent widowers was
solely to "equalize the protection given to the dependents of women
and men."55 There was no legislative documentation or presumable
Federal employment and certain State and local employment,
who are not really dependent on their wives, and with respect
to whom a presumption of dependency would be invalid.
Such men make up a very substantial proportion of the total
number of husbands who would be affected by such a pro-
posal. In view of these considerations, the Council believes
that the dependency requirements that the present law applies
to spouses should not be changed.
REPORTS OF THE 1971 ADVISORY CouNcIL ON SOCIAL SEcuRITY, H.R. Doc.
No. 92.80, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 22-23 (1971) (footnote omitted). An
assumption that the family breadwinner is a man is certainly not un-
founded, especially when one considers the era (1935-1950) in which
these statutes were enacted. Even today more women receive social
security benefits as dependent wives, widows, and mothers than as
workers. In 1972, over 8 million men were receiving monthly benefits
of which 99.9 percent were receiving them as retired workers. At the
same time, some 13 million women were receiving monthly benefits,
but only 47 percent of these were receiving them as retired workers.
Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec., 1972, at 74-78 (tables Q-
5 to Q-10).
53. Expanded benefits were added to the Social Security Act to "afford
more adequate protection to the family as a unit." H.R. REP. No. 728,
76th Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1939). See also 430 U.S. at 213.
54. Social Security Amendment of 1950, ch. 809, tit. I, § 101(a), 64 Stat.
485 (current revision at 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
55. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SEcuRITY, RECOInVENDATIONS FOR SOCIAL
SEcURITY LEGISLATION, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1949).
These additional benefits were viewed as creating parity between de-
pendents of working men and women, yet the differing support re-
quirements were retained. A program analyst for Social Security
stated:
The earlier legislation made no provision for benefits to a hus-
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intention for disparate treatment of dependent widows and depend-
ent widowers as a conscious effort to redress the "legacy of eco-
nomic discrimination"5 against females.57
The dissenting justices in Goldfarb were able to find a concerted
congressional intent to treat nondependent widows and widowers
differently. Justice Rehnquist claimed that the 1939 amendments
reflect a legislative judgment that widows of social security recipi-
ents were a needy group, and that such enactments for widows'
benefits were in response to congressional recognition of poverty
among this group.58 However, if this had been the congressional
intent, it is unclear why the legislation's scope was limited to only
part of society's widows-those who were also dependents of wage
earners covered by social security. Social security is an insurance
program, that is, insurance in the sense of relating benefits to a
loss of income normally received. It is not a civil rights act, as
the dissent implies, intended to right historical wrongs inflicted
upon women.59 "Because social insurance is effective in the limited
band or widower on a woman's wage record ....
The 1950 amendments have resolved this inequity. The
new law retains the concept of deemed dependency of the
wife on the husband, which fits the usual family situation, but
it also permits the husband or widower to become a benefi-
ciary on the basis of the wife's wage record if he has in fact
been dependent on her.
Riches, supra note 49, at 9, 11.
56. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 359.
57. Mr. Justice Stevens concluded it was
clear that Congress never focused its attention on the question
whether to divide nondependent surviving spouses into two
classes bn the basis of sex.. . . It is fair to infer that habit,
rather than analysis or actual reflection, made it seem accept-
able to equate the terms "widow" and "dependent surviving
spouse."...
This discrimination against a group of males is merely
the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking
about females. . . . [A] rule which effects an unequal dis-
tribution of economic benefits solely on the basis of sex is suf-
ficiently questionable that "due process requires that there be
a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually
intended to serve [the] interest" put forward by the govern-
ment as its justification.
430 U.S. at 222-23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976)).
58. Id. at 231-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. Justice Stevens explained congressional motivation more accurately
when commenting in Goldfarb on the earlier Kahn decision:
For that case involved a discrimination between surviving
spouses which originated in 1885; a discrimination of that
vintage cannot reasonably be supposed to have been mo-
tivated by a decision to repudiate the 19th century presump-
tion that females are inferior to males. It seems clear, there-
fore, that the Court upheld the Florida statute on the basis
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function for which it is intended does not justify placing burdens
upon it which distort its purpose and endanger its acceptance." 60
Certainly no one can dispute the general disparity in financial diffi-
culties confronting lone women, but that is not justification to im-
pute to Congress motives that most assuredly did not exist at the
time the legislation was enacted. 61
The dissent in Goldfarb further advocated sustention of the leg-
islative classification because "[t] he effect of the statutory scheme
is to make it easier for widows." 62 The Reed test, however, deals
with the purpose of the statutory scheme. Since the purpose of
social security was to provide a covered wage earner and his de-
pendents a source of support when deprived of the original support
source, the fact that a secondary effect was not, in itself, constitu-
tionally violative should not be enough to save the originally estab-
lished arbitrary classification which was in violation of constitu-
tional mandates.63
Social security is no more than a social insurance program, a
system of poverty prevention passed in 1935 to prevent a reoccur-
rence of the poverty brought on by the depression of that decade
and to protect the people of this nation against the hazards of old
age, ill health, and unemployment. 64 The concept of such a federal
of a hypothetical justification for the discrimination which
had nothing to do with the legislature's actual motivation.
430 U.S. at 223-24 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). The
Goldfarb dissent, in its apparent unwillingness to dismiss any gender-
based classification as discriminatory, extends to Congress a legislative
purpose that is wholly improbable.
60. J. BROWN, AN AMERICAN PHMLOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 59 (1972).
61. Justice Rehnquist agreed with the plurality that there was no legisla-
tive history indicating Congress had considered the specific case of
nondependent widows or decided such individuals needed benefits de-
spite their lack of dependency, yet concluded "neither is there any
reason to doubt that it singled out the group of aged widows for espe-
cially favorable treatment ... because it saw prevalent throughout
that group a characteristically high level of need." 430 U.S. at 233
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
62. 430 U.S. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
63. To determine legality on a numerical tally basis (three good effects
minus 2 bad effects equal constitutionality) alters the Supreme Court's
role from interpreting the law with respect to the Constitution to that
of scorekeeper. See text accompanying notes 51-57 supra.
64. J. BROWN, supra note 60, at 55. For an excellent discussion concerning
the validity and purposes of the Social Security Act of 1935, see Hel-
vering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). Justice Cardozo, speaking for the
Court, states: "The hope behind this statute is to save men and
women from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting
fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near." Id. at
641.
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social insurance program, the establishment of the mechanism
needed to implement it, and its subsequent passage by Congress
in 1935 were performed with great haste at the urging of President
Roosevelt, who wished to ensure passage while the memories of the
devastating depression were still vivid. Such social legislation had
never before been attempted by the federal government and some
areas, such as unemployment insurance, were completely foreign
to any level of government within the nation. It is not surprising
that such radical legislation should lack the effectiveness intended
in some areas as well as overlooking other areas completely.
For the foregoing reasons the Social Security Act underwent ex-
tensive revision in 1939. Among the major alterations was one
extending coverage from the wage earner to include his wife and
widow. It was during this drastic overhaul of the entire social
insurance program that Justice Rehnquist envisions Congress at-
tempting to correct the historically unfair treatment accorded the
women of this nation. The 1939 Act amended the 1935 Act, and the
1935 Act was an attempt at social insurance-not a civil rights en-
deavor. As social security benefits were expanded to various de-
pendents of wage earners, the initial congressional intent remained
-to define an insurable risk followed by a social security insurance
mechanism "to lift persons out of reliance on the residual relief
system by providing protection as a matter of right."' 5 Considera-
tion of all available evidence reveals little to support the dissent's
hypothesis that Congress intended to compensate nondependent
widows for prior discriminatory treatment via social security legis-
lation.
B. Administrative Convenience
The dissent's second hypothetical justification for allowing dis-
criminatory classifications was "administrative convenience." 66 Leg-
islative and general history contradicted the dissent's first argument
but no such facts either refute or support an assumed purpose of
convenience. It would certainly be within the realm of reasonable
possibility to assume that Congress foresaw an administrative effi-
ciency in making widowers actually prove dependency.6 7 The fol-
lowing, therefore, become basic issues: (1) if Congress did foresee
an administrative convenience, is such a purpose valid regarding
65. J. BROWN, supra note 60, at 62.
66. 430 U.S. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. This argument, however, is speculative at best. The historical back-
ground suggests Congress proceeded on an accepted presumption of
female dependency without focusing on the cost of proving individual
dependency.
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gender-based classifications; and (2) if such classifications are gen-
erally valid, is there a point at which convenience becomes arbi-
trary and "too tenuous to satisfy Reed's requirement that the gen-
der-based difference be substantially related to achievement of the
statutory objective" ?68
The Court plurality, following a long line of cases since Reed,
distinctly rejected administrative convenience as sufficient justifi-
cation for gender-based classifications.6 9 Apparently, convenience
and ease can never justify gender-based distinctions. However,
there are two extrinsic considerations: (1) the previous cases had
not dealt with social security provisions,7 0 and (2) the Court's re-
cent decision in Mathews v. Lucas.71
68. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
69. 430 U.S. at 217. The Reed Court deemed the objectives of reducing
probate court work loads and avoiding intra-family controversies of
insufficient importance to sustain use of overt gender criteria for ap-
pointing estate administrators. 404 U.S. at 76-77. Every decision since
Reed has similarly rejected administrative ease and convenience as
sufficiently important to justify gender-based classifications. In a case
involving statutory denial to unwed fathers of the custody of their
illegitimate children, the Court held:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cog-
nizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed,
one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to
protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may char-
acterize praiseworthy governmental officials no less, and per-
haps more, than mediocre ones.
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence
and care, when it explicitly distains present realities in de-
ference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running rough-
shod over ... important interests ....
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (footnotes omitted). See
also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (" 'administra-
tive convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which
dictates constitutionality").
Kahn and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), both uphold-
ing gender-based classifications, were based not on administrative con-
venience, but rather, on the Court's perception of the justifiable pur-
pose of those laws as remedying disadvantageous conditions suffered
by women.
70. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 411 U.S. 677 (1975), dealt with social se-
curity classifications, and although the Court specifically found the
gender-based distinction involved indistinguishable from that invali-
dated in Frontiero, the government did not advance a convenience
justification argument. The Court, therefore, did not address the
issue.
71. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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Arguably, principles requiring heightened levels of judicial scru-
tiny under equal protection do not carry over into fields of social
insurance legislation. Social security is a statutory scheme devel-
oped piecemeal, expanding and altering over a forty year period,
and distributing payments among millions of people. A precise cor-
relation between need and payments is unattainable given the ad-
ministrative realities involved. The dissent in Goldfarb contended
that "had Congress attempted to distribute program funds in pre-
cise accordance with a purpose to alleviate need, it could very well
have created a procedural leviathan consuming substantial amounts
of those funds in case-by-case determinations of eligibility. '72 The
dissent, however, failed to carry its observations to the essential
issue of equal protection versus sex-based generalities. Congress
indeed recognized the impossibility of distributing funds precisely
on need and, therefore, made a series of connecting assumptions.
When the normal flow of income into a household was interrupted
due to incapacity, death, or old-age of the wage-earner there was
an assumption that household members would require funds to al-
leviate need, an assumption that household members had previously
depended on the wage-earner, and finally, an assumption that the
wage earner was the husband. It is this final assumption which
violates equal protection guarantees.
The acceptable assumption that household members are de-
pendent on the covered wage earner goes hand-in-hand with the
legislative purpose of replacing the household's covered income flow
once it is cut off. It is possible to argue, with justification, that
all beneficiaries of the social security program are not dependent
on the wage earner due to independent wealth or outside revenue
sources. Social security, however, is concerned only with the in-
come derived from employment within the social security system.
Certainly no funds are forwarded to retired or disabled individuals
or their dependents if such individuals were not within the pro-
gram's coverage, regardless of their desperate need for such funds.
An allowable administrative convenience limits concern only to
covered funds, disregarding how monies and funds not within the
confines of the program's limits are distributed throughout society.
An allowable administrative convenience makes distributions based
on the covered wage earner's salary and contributions and not on
the outside income of his dependents. A disallowable administra-
tive convenience arises when distributions are based on the sex of
the covered wage earner. Just as no consideration is given to out-
72. 430 U.S. at 231.
EQUAL PROTECTION
side wealth of the wife or widow, none should be given to the out-
side wealth of the husband or widower. This would appear to be
a logical and equitable conclusion inasmuch as the social security
statutes set forth special provisions where both husband and wife
are covered wage earners, that is, the program takes note of spousal
income only if it is also within the system. If social security were
a welfare program it would be expected that all assets and incomes
be considered, but since social security is a self-contained insurance
program it should be administered regardless of outside circum-
stances unless such outside circumstances are applied to all.
The assumption that the husband is the sole wage earner is arbi-
trary, based on past sex role stereotyping and outdated misconcep-
tions concerning the role of the female as housewife.7 3 The issue
remains whether any legislative classification based on traditional
social presumptions and administrative convenience should be al-
lowed to pass equal protection scrutiny?
7 4
In June of 1976, the Court, in Mathews v. Lucas75 upheld a social
security statute conclusively presuming dependency for all children
save a specified group of illegitimate children. The presumption
was specifically declared to pass equal protection scrutiny on
grounds of administrative convenience. Like Goldfarb, Lucas pre-
sented an issue of constitutionality under the due process clause
of the fifth amendment relating to provisions of the Social Security
Act. In an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, the Court con-
cluded "that, in failing to extend any presumption of dependency
to appellees and others like them, the Act does not impermissibly
discriminate against them as compared with legitimate children or
those illegitimate children who are statutorily deemed depend-
73. The importance of women in the work field and as family providers
is too great to allow such broad generalizations. In 1974 nearly 121/2
million women were heads of families, an increase nearly 250 per-
cent greater than the percentage increase in the total number of all
families since 1960. In only 31 percent of all families was the husband
the sole earner, and where the wife did work, she contributed over 30
percent of the family income in over 40 percent of such families. Bu-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1880, U.S.
WORKING WOMEN, charts 31, 39-41 (1975).
74. Goldfarb was a five to four decision. However, Stevens' concurrence
acknowledged approval of an administrative convenience argument
under the appropriate conditions. Therefore, in reality a majority of
the Court would allow gender-based distinctions solely for administra-
tive ease and convenience.
75. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). Robert Cuffee had lived with Belmira Lucas and
had fathered two children by her. Cuffee died in 1968 without ac-
knowledging in writing or undergoing a judicial proceeding declaring
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ent."76 The Court then attempted to establish criteria for a legiti-
mate administrative convenience. "In cases of strictest scrutiny,
such approximations must be supported at least by a showing that
the Government's dollar 'lost' to overincluded benefit recipients is
returned by a dollar 'saved' in administrative expense avoided." 77
Under the lesser rational relationship test, the likelihood of depend-
ency would not require scientific substantiation nor an inquiry
solely in terms of dollars.
Although Lucas dealt with a social insurance program, the impli-
cations are bewildering. Has the Court lowered its requirement
of a compelling state interest for suspect classifications to a mere
equal dollar value? Can discriminations based on race or national
origin be upheld because the state saves money? Will Plessy v.
Ferguson78 be resurrected because the cost of bussing increases the
him to be the father of either child. Mrs. Lucas filed an application
on behalf of the children for surviving children's benefits based upon
Cuffee's earning record.
In general, the Social Security Act provided that any unmarried
children under 18 years of age were entitled to survivor's benefits if
they were dependent (within the meaning of the statute) on the de-
ceased at the time of his death. Certain children were allowed a pre-
sumption of dependency, thus relieving them of any burden of proving
actual dependency. Basically, those children entitled to such pre-
sumptions of dependency were all legitimate children, other children
acknowledged in writing by the deceased, children the deceased was
under court order to support, and finally, children of the surviving
spouse if he or she had been legally married to the deceased. 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d) (1), (3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (prior to 1974 amendment).
The appellees maintained that a denial of benefits where paternity
was clear violated equal protection of the laws since other children,
including all legitimate children, were statutorily entitled to survivor-
ship benefits regardless of actual dependency. The Court held "[s]tat-
utory classifications . . . are not per se unconstitutional; the matter
depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to
legitimate legislative aims." 427 U.S. at 503-04. Classifications based
on legitimacy do not warrant strict judicial scrutiny. For one of the
first times, administrative convenience was upheld under an equal
protection attack.
To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the ex-
tension of a presumption of dependency. But the constitu-
tional question is not whether such a presumption is required,
but whether it is permitted .... These matters of practical
judgment and empirical calculation are for Congress. ...
Our role is simply to determine whether Congress' assump-
tions are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reason-
ably supportive of its conclusions that individualized factual
inquiry. . . is unwarranted as an administrative exercise.
Id. at 515-16.
76. Id. at 516.
77. Id. at 509-10.
78. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" treatment of
blacks).
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tax levy? Certainly one would doubt the Court intended such in-
terpretations, but just as certainly the implications are there.
Other questions are raised when viewing Lucas in the context
of other legislative classifications. Is the Court in complete contra-
diction of itself in Lucas and Goldfarb? Is the distinction drawn
between illegitimate-legitimate children and widows-widowers
warranted? Was the administrative convenience found in Lucas
greater than that found in Goldfarb? Was the rational relationship
more rational in Lucas? Does sex demand a greater degree of scru-
tiny? Is child dependency easier to prove than spousal depend-
ency? The statutory scheme essentially does not extend a presump-
tion of dependency to illegitimate children not living with or being
supported by the wage earning parent. There can be no doubt that
there are legitimate children as well as illegitimate children exempt
from proving dependency who are not in fact dependent on the
natural father through whom they claim. To limit equal protection
to situations in which it is convenient subjects such protection to
the arbitrary views of legislatures and courts to decide when it shall
be convenient. 79 The law creates a judicially enforceable right of
support on behalf of children from the natural parents. When a
parent is a covered wage earner the government assumes this right
to support upon the death of the parent. If the parent has illegally
disavowed his responsibility, the responsibility of the government
should not necessarily tumble as well. The child suffers a double
punishment, once during the parent's lifetime and again after the
parent's death.
79. Whether the classification is expressed in terms of eligible
classes or in terms of presumptions of dependency, the fact
remains that legitimacy, written acknowledgments, or state
law makes eligible many children who are no more likely to
be "dependent" than are the children in appellee's situation.
Yet in the name of "administrative convenience" the Court
allows these survivors' benefits to be allocated on grounds
which have only the most tenuous connection to the sup-
posedly controlling factor-the child's dependency on his
father.
427 U.S. at 522-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
Justice Blackmun stated: "[I]t adds nothing to say that the illegiti-
mate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of proving en-
titlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not prove. The
legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove the facts
upon which his statutory entitlement rests." 427 U.S. at 503-04 n.7.
However, the legitimate child is extended a presumption of depend-
ency so that evidently the only fact he needs to prove is that his parent
actually died.
576 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
A second apparent distinction is the degree of rational relation-
ship needed for gender classifications and those based on legitimacy.
Lucas limited illegitimacy to a traditional rational test; "because
illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this
discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the sever-
ity [of] discrimination against women and Negroes.18 0 Yet it
would seem, like race and sex, illegitimacy is wholly determined
by birth, uncontrolled by the individual subject, and entirely unre-
lated to that individual's ability to contribute to society. Histori-
cally, this society has made distinctions between male and female,
alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate, black and white. Such
stereotyping should be abolished-and can be through the provi-
sions of the 'equal protection clause. To allow continuation of sep-
arate treatment by such classifications prolongs a cancer which soci-
ety and the courts have a duty to remove. There would seem to
be no constitutional excuse for sidestepping these issues by refer-
ring to secondary distinctions, such as dependency or non-depend-
ency, and then upholding such classifications because they are ad-
ministratively convenient. 81 The distinctions and arguments ap-
plied by the Court do not point out the correctness of Goldfarb
as much as they do the incorrectness of Lucas.
If in fact administrative convenience is a justifiable basis for
gender distinctions as the dissent contends, can the widow-assump-
tion-of-dependency statute be upheld? Are there few enough aged
widows not dependent on a husband at the time of his death that
the cost of administering inquiries of actual proof would exceed
any future benefits they might receive? Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens contend ninety percent of all widows would be eligible for
benefits under a dependency test similar to that administered wid-
owers. In Rehnquist's opinion, "[t] his nine-tenths correlation ap-
pears sufficiently high to justify extension of benefits to the other
one-tenth for reasons of administrative convenience. '8 2  Stevens
concluded that administrative convenience would cost the govern-
ment approximately one billion dollars, which would be excessive.8 3
The acceptance of an administrative convenience rationale will
only obscure an already clouded area by basing sex discrimination
on imprecise dollar values-on judicial instincts and intuitions as
to when the magic amount has been overstepped.
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state
officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statis-
80. 427 U.S. at 506.
81. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. 430 U.S. at 239 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 220 n.5.
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tical technique. But this merely illustrates that proving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and
one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause.
8 4
C. Contract Theory
A final argument made in support of administrative convenience
is that social security is a noncontract benefit and therefore less
scrutiny is required than in other divisions of the law. The Court
has maintained a person's right to social security benefits is not
considered an "accrued property right."85 Although the program
is participatory in nature, in the sense that benefits are not ex-
tended to persons without a close relationship to an individual con-
tributing to the program, Congress did not enact social security
with contractual obligations in mind.86 Flemming v. Nestor,8 7 the
most notable holding in the area, characterized the social security
program as a form of social insurance whereby wage earners and
their employers are taxed to permit benefits to the retired and dis-
abled, and their dependents. Eligibility and the amount of such
benefits depend on the wage earner's earning record, not on his
or her contributions. Therefore it is apparent that the interest of
the employee covered by the Act cannot be contractual.8 8 The
Court went on to state:
84. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (footnote omitted).
85. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975).
86. See § IV-A of text supra.
87. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
88. Id. at 610. Justice Black, in dissent, argued the Court was holding
that, in spite of the contributions by the covered workers, the Social
Security payments were merely gifts terminable at will by the govern-
ment which was contrary to the purpose and intent of the system. Id.
at 621.
Interestingly, the non-contractual concept involving social security
developed from a questionable factual situation. Ephram Nestor
had immigrated from Bulgaria in 1913, remaining in this country 43
years, for 19 of which he was covered by the Social Security Act. He
became eligible for benefits in November, 1955. However, in July,
1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist
Party from 1933 until 1939. He was denied benefits under Section 202
(n) of the Social Security Act, which terminated old-age benefits pay-
able to any alien after September 1, 1954, who was deported as having
been a member of the Communist Party. The Court held it was not
a punishment, but merely denial of a non-contractual benefit. The
dissenting opinions contended the statute was ex post facto and a bill
of attainder since in 1939 neither was it illegal to be a Communist
nor was it statutory grounds for deportation. Id. at 622.
Considering the political climate of the tim-, the Communist witch-
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Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a non-contractual
benefit under a social welfare program such as this, we must recog-
nize that the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a
bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,
utterly lacking in rational justification.8 9
How should the foregoing statement affect the Reed test applied
by Goldfarb? When dealing with gender-based classifications in
conjunction with social welfare programs, should they be judged
by Reed's fair and substantial test or Nestor's patently arbitrary
test? Undoubtedly classifications requiring strict scrutiny will be
unaffected by Nestor, as well as those subjected to minimum tier
scrutiny, inasmuch as congressional social and economic policies tra-
ditionally pass a rational relationship inspection. Therefore, the
only classification arguably affected would be the middle-tier gen-
der-based distinctions set forth in Reed. No matter how much or
little due process requirements are relaxed by Nestor, equal protec-
tion guarantees should allow no adjustments where only classifica-
tions based on gender are involved.9 1 "We do not see how the fact
that social security benefits are 'noncontractual' can sanction differ-
ential protection for covered employees which is solely gender
based."
92
Classifications for noncontractual benefits must still serve a gov-
ernmental objective and be related to the results of such objectives.
hunt of the 1950's, it can hardly be said the legislative purpose was
not to impose punishment rather than further the legitimate objectives
of the Social Security program. "The fact that the Court is sustaining
this action indicates the extent to which people are willing to go these
days to overlook violations of the Constitution perpetrated against
anyone who has ever even innocently belonged to the Communist
Party." Id. at 622 (Black, 3., dissenting).
89. Id. at 611. See also Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dand-
ridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
90. In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classifi-
cation has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Con-
stitution simply because the classification "is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
91. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court dealt with a Cali-
fornia disability insurance program exempting female workers under-
going normal pregnancy. Although holding there was no requirement
that a state "subordinate or compromise its legitimate interests solely
to create a more comprehensive social insurance program," the case
was decided on a lack of discrimination within the individual risks
covered, rather than a lack of discrimination against women. Id. at
496.
92. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 646.
EQUAL PROTECTION
To rule otherwise results in open invitation to breathe new life into
the time worn generalizations, archaic traditions, invidious stereo-
types, and sexual discriminations the Court should be attempting
to eradicate rather than resurrect. To allow a lessening of equal
protection scrutiny for noncontractual benefits validates the dis-
sent's attempt at an end run-an end run which merely postpones,
evades, and ignores a problem the Court should no longer avoid,
the problem of equal protection for women. Despite the contrac-
tuality of a governmental benefit and despite the gender of an em-
ployee, each employee deserves equal treatment for his or herself
and his or her dependents.93
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93. There has developed through the years a feeling both in and
out of Congress that the contributory social insurance prm-
ciple fits our times-that it serves a vital need that cannot be
as well served otherwise. It comports better than any sub-
stitute we have discovered with the American concept that
free men want to earn-their security and not ask for doles-
that what is due as a matter of earned right is far better than
a gratuity..
Social security is not a handout; it is not charity; it is not
relief. It is an earned right based upon the contributions and
earnings of the individual. As an earned right, the individual
is eligible to receive his benefit in dignity and self respect.
102 CONG. Rac. 15110 (1956) (statement made by Senator George,
Chairman of the Finance Committee when the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1956 were enacted).

